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This artic le  seek s  to  draw  p o ssib le  le sson s for ad ap tation  program m es in  B angladesh  b y  exam in in g  
w h eth er  cyclon e  p repared ness and re lie f in terven tion s are subject to  corrupt practices. Based o n  a 
random  sam p le  survey  o f  2 7 8  h ou seh o ld s, th ree focus-group  d iscu ssio n s and sev en  key-in form ant 
in terv iew s, th e  article in v estig a tes  th e  nature and e x te n t o f  corrup tion  in pre- and p o st-d isa ster  
in terven tion s in  Khulna before and after  C yclone Aila in M ay 20 0 9 . N in ety  n in e p ercen t o f  h ou seh o ld s  
reported  lo sses  from  corrupt practices. P ost-d isaster  in terven tion s (su ch  as food  aid and p u b lic  w orks  
sch em es) suffered  from  greater lev e ls , and w o rse  typ es, o f  corruption  th an  p re-d isaster  in terven tion s  
(su ch  as cyc lo n e  w arn in g  sy ste m s and d isaster-p rep ared n ess train ing). U sing an a sse t in d ex  created  
u sin g  principal co m p o n en t analysis , th e  article a sse sse s  h o w  corruption  a ffected  w ea lth  quartiles. U ltra­
poor h o u seh o ld s  w ere  a ffected  m ore by  corrup tion  in  p re-d isaster  in terven tion s, th e  w e a lth ie s t  quartile  
m ore in  certain  p ost-d isa ster  in terven tion s, in particular pu blic  w orks and n o n -govern m en ta l 
in terven tion s. T hese findings m ay hold  le sso n s  for a ttem p ts  to increase res ilien ce  as current adap tation  
m easures m irror so m e cyc lo n e  p rep ared n ess and r e lie f efforts.
© 2 0 1 2  E lsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The In tergovernm ental Panel on Climate Change (2001, 2007) 
indicates Bangladesh is highly vulnerable to  clim ate change. 
Projected im pacts include greater scarcity of fresh w ater in th e  dry 
season (due to  less rain and higher évapotranspiration), greater 
drainage congestion (due to  higher levels in w ate r courses partly  
from higher sea levels), greater river bank erosion, m ore frequent 
and severe floods and cyclones, and greater soil salinity in the 
coastal zone. Such hydrological changes particularly  th rea ten  low- 
lying coastal areas w here citizens live in flood- and cyclone-prone 
locations.
The Bangladeshi governm ent is com m itted  to  adap ta tion  as 
illustrated  by th e  country’s N ational A daptation Program m e of 
Action (NAPA), th e  Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, 
National Climate Change Trust Fund and th e  m ulti-donor Climate 
Resilient Fund (for exam ple, see MoEF, 2005, 2009, and GLCA, 
2009). However, th e  success o f program m es depends partly  on the
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level o f fiduciary risk (in o ther words, th a t adapta tion  funds are 
used for in tended purposes). Here there  is good reason to be 
concerned. Bangladesh w as ranked bo ttom  of Transparency 
In ternational’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for five conse­
cutive years betw een  2001 and 2005. W hilst th is ranking has 
recently  recently, th e  2010 CPI still placed Bangladesh 134th from 
178 countries.
To try  and draw  useful lessons for clim ate adaptation, this 
article investigates th e  nature  and ex ten t o f corruption  in cyclone 
preparedness and relief efforts in coastal Bangladesh. It focuses on 
interventions before and after Cyclone Aila th a t struck South-W est 
Bangladesh and coast o f W est Bengal, India, on th e  25 th  May, 2009. 
According to  th e  D isaster M anagem ent Bureau (2010), Aila killed 
190 people directly  and affected over 3.9 m illion (w ith  243,000 
houses and 77,000 acres of farm land destroyed or badly dam aged). 
Even fourteen m onths afterw ards, w hen th e  prim ary research for 
th is article w as conducted, em bankm ents in four upazillas (the 
sub-district adm inistrative unit) in Khulna and Satkhira districts 
had not been repaired and over 47,000 households w ere still 
hom eless. A key aim  of the research w as to  investigate how  the 
experience of corruption  varied across w ealth  groups.
The article consists of five fu rther sections. Section Two offers a 
quick overview  of th e  relationship betw een  corruption  and 
developm ent, a b rief sum m ary of th e  em ergent literature  on 
corruption  and clim ate change, before focusing on corruption  in
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Bangladesh. The th ird  section discusses th e  inheren t difficulties of 
researching corruption, and outlines the research m ethods and 
statistical techniques em ployed. Sections 4 and 5 presen t findings 
on corruption  in pre- and post-d isaster interventions, respectively. 
The sixth section concludes.
2. Corruption in Bangladesh: an overview
The ex ten t to  w hich corruption  im pedes national developm ent 
has been a m atte r o f debate. The in tu itive argum ent th a t 
corruption  is one cause of low econom ic grow th and high poverty 
rates (M yrdal, 1968) can be contrasted  against argum ents w here 
corruption  is seen to  im prove efficiency th rough  overcom ing 
m arket failures caused by bureaucracies (Leff, 1964). The recent 
m acro-level evidence, unsurprisingly, favours the form er argu­
m ent, especially w hen considering hum an developm ent, and 
highlights m ultip le equilibria in th e  negative relationship betw een  
corruption  and developm ent (see Aidt, 2009; Haque and Kneller, 
2009; Qizilbash, 2001). N um erous m icro-level m echanism s -  such 
as path  dependency th rough  reduced reporting, low er penalities 
and peer-group effects -  are suggested as possible channels 
th rough  w hich countries rem ain  locked in a high corruption, low 
developm ent trap  (see Aidt, 2009).
Despite substantial financial flows required  for m itigation and 
adaptation , until recently  there  has been little m ention of 
corruption  w ith in  clim ate debates. This can partly  be explained 
by the  burden  of m itigation falling on Annex I parties w here, on the 
whole, there  are reasonably low levels of corruption, and th e  late 
arrival of adap ta tion  to  th e  clim ate stage (Pielke e t al., 2007). 
However, due partly  to  a lack of integrity  w ith in  th e  Clean 
D evelopm ent M echanism  (Green, 2008; Ostrom, 2010), concerns 
about high levels of corruption  in certain  forestry m inistries (see 
Ebeling and Yasue, 2009 ; Barr e t al., 2010) and th e  pressing need to 
d isburse fast-start funding for adaptation , greater em phasis is now 
being placed on corruption. This is m ost clearly dem onstrated  
th rough  Transparency In ternational’s (2011) annual report on 
clim ate change. This includes tw o chapters on Bangladesh -  
M artinez and Bastem eijer (2011 ) and Zaman and Khuda (2011 ) -  
w here it is accepted corruption  is w idespread and contributes to 
social and econom ic deprivation (Iftekharuzzam an, 2009; Ifte- 
kharuzzam an and Tanvir, 2008; TIB, 2008; Tanvir, 2006). For 
exam ple, th e  W orld Bank (2000) estim ated  if Bangladesh could 
reduce corruption  to  the level prevailing in Scandinavian countries, 
it could add 2.1 to  2.9 percent to annual per capita GDP grow th.
W hilst corruption  is often defined as ‘th e  abuse of public office 
for private gain’ (see Bardhan, 1997), th is article uses Transparency 
In ternational’s definition of corruption  -  the  abuse of en trusted  
pow er for private gain -  and considers eight forms of corruption
(see Transparency International, 2009; Karklins, 2002). First, 
bribery, defined as offering, prom ising, giving, accepting or 
soliciting an advantage as an inducem ent for an  action w hich is 
illegal, unethical or a breach of trust. Second, wage/asset stripping, 
w hich is th e  appropriation  or illegal use of en tru sted  funds/goods 
for personal gain. Third, extortion, defined as an  act o f utilizing, 
e ither directly  or indirectly, one’s access to  a position of pow er or 
know ledge to  coerce unm erited  cooperation o r com pensation. For 
exam ple, a service provider m ay force a recipient to  m ake an 
unofficial paym ent. Fourth, fraud, th e  act of in tentionally  deceiving 
som eone in order to  gain unfair or illegal advantage. Fifth, 
favouritism, nepotism  and patronage. Usually based on acquain­
tances and kin relations, these actions involve the  exploitation  of 
pow er/au thority  to  provide unm erited  opportunities for family or 
friends. Patronage often seeks the cultivation of political and /or 
clientelist netw orks. Sixth, refusal o r negligence to provide services. 
For instance, w hen  service providers create a barrier so recipients 
offer illicit paym ents. Seventh, influence peddling, defined as 
influencing decision-m aking for personal benefit (and w hich 
contrasts w ith  legitim ate political lobbying). And eighth, procure­
m ent irregularities, w here an  official aw ards a contract o r influences 
the  tendering  process for personal interest.
T ransparency International Bangladesh (2010) provides esti­
m ates of th e  scale of corruption: 72% of households w ere forced to 
pay bribes averaging Tk. 4834 (US$ 68.6) for receiving services 
from different sectors from June 2009 to  May 2010. This equates to 
a m ean annual per capita figure o f Tk. 637 (US$ 9.04), and a to tal of 
Tk. 95.92 billion (US$ 1.36 billion). The sam e survey show s the 
incidence of corruption  w as highest in th e  judiciary  (w here 88% of 
households receiving services w ere victim s o f corruption), 
followed by th e  law  enforcem ent services (80%) and land 
adm inistra tion  (71%), as illustrated  in Table 1.
Im portantly, the im pact of corruption  differs across w ealth  
categories. Iftekharuzzam an (2009) estim ates th a t 3.84% of annual 
household incom e in 2007 w as absorbed by corruption  in six 
sectors (education, health, land adm inistration, law  enforcem ent, 
the  judiciary and tax authorities). Disaggregated by incom e 
categories, these estim ates suggest low -incom e households lost 
4.1 percent, m iddle-incom e households 3.6 percent, and high- 
incom e households 2.4 percent of annual income.
There is also evidence som e sectors central to  clim ate policy 
and adap ta tion  -  for exam ple, forest and environm ent, and d isaster 
m anagem ent and relief -  suffer from corrupt practices. TIB’s 
C orruption Database 2005, w hich utilises and verifies reports of 
corruption  published in leading new spapers, suggests forest and 
environm ent w as one of th e  m ost corrupt sectors in Bangladeshi 
society. Almost 90% of individuals reportedly  involved in corrupt 
practices in th is sector w ere governm ent officers/em ployees, w ith
Table 1
Extent of corruption in Bangladesh's service sectors, June 2009-M ay 2010.
Sector Proportion o f households 
receiving services who  
experienced corruption (%)
Proportion of households 
receiving services who  
paid bribes (%)
Average amount 
of bribe paid 
(in Taka)
National estimate 
of bribes paid 
(in millions of Taka)
Judiciary 88.0 59.6 7918 16192
Law enforcement agencies 79.7 68.1 3352 5014
Land administration 71.2 67.0 6116 35194
Tax, VAT & customs 51.3 43.9 6734 2235
Electricity 45.9 27.6 1834 8126
Local government 43.9 36.7 913 6283
Health 33.2 13.2 463 1691
Banking 17.4 12.7 1928 3927
Education 15.3 15.0 168 1087
NGO 10.1 7.2 549 422
Others 34.1 35.5 6804 11570
Overall 84.2 71.9 4834 95916
Source: TIB (2010).
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62% of reported  cases involving th e  abuse of pow er (a com posite 
te rm  encapsulating extortion, favouritism /nepotism /patronage, 
influence peddling, and procurem ent irregularities), followed by 
bribery (22%) and asset stripping (8%). The database also suggests 
th e  d isaster m anagem ent and relief sector suffered from low er 
levels o f corruption. In this sector, 91% of individuals allegedly 
involved in corruption  w ere elected representatives w ith  54% of 
alleged cases involving the  abuse of pow er and 37% bribery. Before 
reporting our findings on corruption  in p re- and post-d isaster 
in terventions associated w ith  Cyclone Aila, w e discuss th e  intrinsic 
difficulties of generating accurate data  on corruption, and the 
research m ethods and statistical techniques em ployed.
3. Researching corruption, methods and statistical techniques
M easuring corruption  is very challenging. Not only is it a 
‘h idden’ phenom enon, bu t corrup t practices are m anifestations of 
broader system ic failures w hich condition actors’ behaviour 
(Duncan and Dutta, 2006). In this respect, abstracting  isolated 
incidents of corruption  from w ider processes risks m isunderstand­
ing its im pact (ibid.). That said, certain  research approaches can 
im prove th e  likelihood of accurately m easuring and understand ing  
th e  phenom enon. For example, Reinikka and Svensson (2006) 
detail how  precise definitions, triangulation  w ith  qualitative 
m ethods and formal hypothesis testing  can im prove th e  data 
generated  (on this last point, see Olken, 2007, for an  innovative 
experim ental approach). Our approach in th is article -  to  elicit 
inform ation from beneficiaries of pre- and post-d isaster in terven­
tions -  resonates strongly w ith  th e  first tw o o f these ‘principles’.
In this respect, w e explicitly d ifferentiate th e  nature of 
corruption  w e investigated, and clearly s ta te  w hether data  is first 
o r second hand. In w hat follows, th e  ex ten t o f corruption  is 
m easured by both  its frequency (the  proportion  o f beneficiaries 
affected, or w ho claim  corruption  took place) and its severity. 
There are tw o aspects to  th e  severity o f each practice. First, the  
incom e/opportunities lost as a consequence of corrupt practices. 
This is detailed w here possible. Second, th e  vulnerability  of 
victim s. Because corruption  in pre-d isaster interventions took 
place before households’ vulnerability  w as exacerbated  by Cyclone 
Aila such practices have been allocated a ‘m ild’ rating. In o ther 
words, perpetrato rs w ere not certain  the ir actions w ould harm  (for 
they  w ere not fully aw are of the  im m inent risk). In contrast, 
corrupt practices in post-d isaster in terventions have been 
allocated a ‘severe’ rating as such practices occurred after 
households w ere in acute distress. In o ther words, perpetrators 
w ere fully aw are the ir actions w ould harm  (and as such w ere 
especially callous). W e also need to  be clear about first- and 
second-hand accounts o f corruption. Needless to say, only data 
about responden ts’ ow n experience of corruption  can be trea ted  as 
robust. The only occasion w e utilise second-hand hearsay data  is 
regarding governm ent a ttem p ts to  reconstruct em bankm ents (and 
th e  reader is advised to  be cautious about these results).
Fieldwork w as conducted in collaboration w ith  the Coastal 
Research Foundation (CRF) during June/July 2010. A household 
survey, focus group discussions (FGDs) and key inform ant interviews 
(KIIs) w ere conducted. It should be noted the study area is rem ote 
w ith  little infrastructure o r law and order. Before entering the field it 
w as essential to develop a good netw ork w ith  law  enforcem ent 
agencies and elites to  ensure the security of the research team. 
Unsurprisingly in such a context, som e respondents w ere nervous or 
w ere in terrupted  by friends or family m em bers during the interview. 
These questionnaires w ere excluded from the analysis.
The survey w as conducted in one upazilla in Khulna, due to the 
severe im pact o f Aila on this part o f the coastal belt. A three-stage 
random  sam pling technique w as followed: one union w as random ly 
selected from th e  upazilla; four w ards w ere random ly selected from
the union; and 75 households w ere random ly selected from each 
ward. As a sam pling fram e was no t available in this post-disaster 
setting, w e utilized a transect approach. Depending on the 
population size in the ward, every fifth to  n in th  household was 
selected. The study aim ed to  sam ple 300 households, bu t during data 
cleaning 22 questionnaires w ere excluded as the veracity of 
responses w as questionable. Eight experienced assistants w ere 
recruited and trained for the survey. Each enum erator surveyed six 
to  seven households per day. Q uestionnaires w ere checked each 
evening by th e  lead researcher and unsuitable questionnaires 
returned. In cases w here the household head w as not available, 
subsequent visits w ere made. If the household head w as still not 
available, an adu lt decision m aker w as interviewed.
Survey data  was triangulated w ith  th ree focus group discussions 
conducted w ith  different com m unity groups: w om en, the social 
elite (school teachers, religious leaders, public officers, and 
businessm en), and farm ers/day labourers (averaging ten  partici­
pants). Seven key inform ant interviews w ere also conducted during 
and after the survey to  assess corruption in d isaster m anagem ent. 
Inform ants included the M em ber of Parliament, chairm en of 
upazilla parishad and union parishad, governm ent officers, a 
representative from a civil society organisation, and journalists. 
Sem i-structured checklists w ere used during both  FGDs and KIIs.
To enable th e  com parison of corruption  across w ealth  catego­
ries, w e utilised an  asset index. Different au thors suggest various 
m ethods and techniques to construct such indices (for example, 
see Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Hulme and McKay, 2005; Moser 
and Felton, 2007), and they  are being utilised w ith  increasing 
frequency (see, for example, Ansoms and McKay, 2010; Dasgupta 
and Baschierri, 2010; M arivoet and Keje, 2011). A recent overview  
of applications is offered by H arttgen and Klasen (2012) w ho argue 
asset indices can be seen as robust proxies for incom e/expenditure 
data  (bu t not consum ption data, see Howe e t al„ 2009). As such, 
they  argue w hilst asset indices are not perfect proxies they  provide 
a good indicator o f long-term  living standards.
W e utilised principal com ponents analysis (PCA), a data 
reduction  technique to  sum m arise an  original set of variables to 
a set of uncorrelated  com ponents. Such an  approach offers a 
straightforw ard and parsim onious w ay of assessing w ealth , and 
arguably vulnerability  and adaptive capacity (see Adger e t al„ 
2004; Rygel e t al., 2006). Our sam ple size of 278 households is 
sufficient for PCA (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). W e used the 
Sustainable Rural Livelihoods fram ew ork as a guiding tool 
(Cham bers and Conway, 1992; Carney, 1999). U nder this 
fram ew ork five types o f capital assets are distinguished: hum an 
capital, socio-political capital; natural capital; physical capital; and 
financial capital. U nder these five capitals, w e used 17 variables 
from reported  data  on asset holdings before Aila:
• H um an capital: years of education of household head.
• Social/political capital: social and political connections of 
households (w hether they  take part in salish -  a social system  
for inform al arb itra tion  of petty  disputes; are a m em ber of a 
school m anagem ent/religious com m ittee; or have relatives 
am ong governm ent officers, journalists, or public rep resen ta­
tives).
• N atural capital: to ta l cultivatable land (acres).
• Physical capital: type of housing structure  and ow nership  of 
consum er durables/capital goods (TV, radio, bike, pots, tab le  and 
chairs, m obile phone).
• Financial capital: average m onthly  household income.
Second, the variables w ith in  physical capital and socio-political 
capital w ere aggregated using nom inal w eights: m onetary  value 
for th e  form er (apart from housing w hich also accrued a non­
m onetary  value); au tho rs’ expertise for th e  latter. Third, we
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ensured  the five capitals w ere norm ally d istribu ted  and signifi­
cantly  correlated a t th e  99% level. Fourth, appropriate robustness 
checks w ere utilised to  ensure data  w as suitable for Principal 
Com ponents Analysis. The K aiser-M eyer-O lkin M easure of 
Sampling A dequacy tested  for th e  proportion  of variance in the 
variables caused by underlying processes. The result o f 0.74 is well 
w ith in  th e  necessary range for PCA (>0.5 and <1). The data  also 
satisfied th e  B artlett’s Test o f Sphericity (A pproxim ate Chi-Square 
251.968; d.f. 10; Sig. 0.000) w hich tested  the  hypothesis the 
correlations in th e  correlation m atrix  are zero (bu t w hich is very 
sensitive to  sam ple size -  see Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007).
As Table 2 shows, PCA extracted  one com ponent from the  five 
capitals w ith  the  necessary eigenvalue of greater th an  1 (again, see 
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2007). This com ponent explained 47% of the 
variance in th e  original variables. The com ponent score coefficients 
show  th e  factor loadings applied to  the five variables to  construct 
th e  asset index (hum an capital 0.257, natural capital 0.287, socio­
political capital 0.263, financial capital score 0.31, physical capital 
score 0.338). Fifth, th e  asset score w as sorted in an  ascending 
fashion and used to divide th e  households into four equally-sized 
w ealth  quartiles: u ltra  poor, poor, a m iddle group and th e  w ealthy. 
W e now  tu rn  to  ou r findings, first on corruption  in pre-d isaster 
interventions.
4. Corruption in pre-disaster Interventions
Three p re-d isaster interventions are now  discussed: cyclone 
w arning system s; d isaster-preparedness training; and access to 
cyclone shelters. Each part assesses access to  these services across 
th e  four w ealth  quartiles.
4.1. Cyclone warning systems
The survey found only 38% of households received a w arning 
m essage before Aila (see Table 3). Looking into th e  w ealth  
quartiles, a higher proportion o f w ealthy  households received a 
m essage (55%) com pared to  poorer households (significant a t the 
99% level). For exam ple, only 24% of u ltra-poor households 
received one. Table 3 also show s households’ perception  of the 
suitability  of w arning m essages before Aila, w ith  83% not
considering m essages as ‘appropria te’. Looking into poverty 
quartiles, 93% of u ltra-poor households through to  72% of w ealthy 
households considered th e  m essages as ‘inappropria te’ (significant 
a t th e  99% level). The survey also enquired  about th e  different w ays 
w arning m essages w ere received by households (see Table 4). 
Here, th e  difference betw een  w ealth  groups is no t substantial. For 
exam ple, m ost o f th e  poorest (46.7%) and w ealth iest households 
(54.3%) received w arning m essages by radio or television, from the 
m arket place or from friends/relatives.
That m any households did not receive a w arning m essage poses 
questions about th e  effectiveness o f early w arning systems. 
Specifically, it suggests a negligence to  provide services. 
Bangladesh has a good adm inistrative set-up w ith in  local 
governm ent. Along w ith  th e  W eather Forecast D epartm ent and 
D isaster M anagem ent Com m ittee a t th e  local level, th e  union 
parishad (low er tie r of local governm ent) is responsible for the 
d issem ination  of w arning m essages by different m eans (including 
a m icrophone announcem ent). It appears m any of these system s 
failed.
In addition, although 38% of households received a cyclone 
w arning before Aila, they  did not take it seriously enough. 
Participants in tw o FGDs explained as the  height of the  previous 
tidal surge during Cyclone Sidr in 2007 w as over-estim ated, m any 
people under-estim ated  th e  height during Aila. In addition, Aila 
w as only given a category 7 cyclone rating. As people in this 
upazilla are used to  facing m ore serious threats, they  did no t give 
the  w arning m essage sufficient credence. R espondents also 
suggested businessm en, w ith  the  help of W ater Developm ent 
Board officials, had w eakened the  strength  of em bankm ents 
th rough  cutting  holes so saline w ater could allow  shrim p 
cultivation. A high tidal surge, excessive w ate r p ressure and poor 
m aintenance m eant "everything was destroyed within a single 
moment. Many people were washed away with the tidal surge, others 
were helpless struggling to survive".
4.2. Disaster preparedness training
W e now  consider w hether households a ttended  d isaster 
p reparedness train ing before or after Aila. Table 5 show s only 
14% of households a ttended  a training session beforehand. This is a
Table 2
Total variance explained: principal component analysis.
Component Initial eigen values Extraction sums of squared loadings
Total % of variance Cumulative % Total % of variance Cumulative %
1 2.337 46.736 46.736 2.37 46.736 46.736
2 .945 18.895 65.632
3 .688 13.755 79.387
4 .566 11.317 90.704
5 .465 9.296 100.000
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Extraction method: principal component analysis.
Table 3
- Warning message before Aila by wealth quartiles.
Poverty Quartiles Received warning message (%) Appropriateness of Aila message (%)
Yes No Total Yes No Total
Ultra Poor 24.3 75.7 100 7.2 92.8 100
Poor 44.3 55.7 100 20.3 79.7 100
Middle 29 71 100 11.6 88.4 100
Wealthy 55.1 49.9 100 27.5 72.5 100
Total 38.1 61.9 100 16.7 83.3 100
a  = 0.01, d .f=3, X2 = 17.65 a  = 0.007, d.f =3, X2 = 12.209
Source: household survey.
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Table 4
Medium of warning message by wealth quartiles.
Wealth category (%) Warning Message Received from
Market or friends or relatives Radio or television Mike announcement or mobile text message Total
Ultra poor 45% 45% 10% 100%
Poor 39.5% 50% 10.5% 100%
Middle 28.6% 61.9% 9.5% 100%
Wealthy 31.9% 51.1% 17% 100%
Source: household survey, based on multiple responses.
Table 5
- Disaster preparedness training program before and after Aila.
Wealth quartiles Disaster preparedness training/ 
program before Aila (%)
Disaster preparedness training/ 
program after Aila (%)
Irregularities in training program (%)
Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No No response Total
Ultra poor 10 90 100 21.4 78.6 100 22.9 35.7 41.4 100
Poor 17.1 82.9 100 12.9 87.1 100 35.7 28.6 35.7 100
Middle 8.7 91.3 100 17.4 82.6 100 40.6 24.6 34.8 100
Wealthy 21.7 78.3 100 29 71 100 24.6 44.9 30.4 100
Total 14.4 85.6 100 20.1 79.9 100 30.9 33.5 35.6 100
a  = 0.095, d.f =3, x 2 = 6.367 a  = 0.109, d.f = 3, x 2 = 6-061 Substantial proportion of non responses
Source: Household survey.
surprisingly low figure for such a hazard-prone location. Again, 
looking into w ealth  quartiles, the  g reatest proportion  is th e  22% of 
w ealthy  households. M iddle stra ta  households (9%) a ttended  less 
th an  bo th  poor (17%) and ultra-poor households (10%) (the  chi- 
squared statistic  reports significance a t th e  90% level o f confi­
dence).
Table 5 also displays a slightly different p icture regarding 
participation in training after Aila. Overall, 80% of households did 
not a ttend  any training after th e  cyclone. Again, a greater 
proportion  of w ealthy  households (29%) m anaged to attend, this 
tim e followed by th e  u ltra  poor (21%), m iddle households (17%) 
and poor households (13%) bu t these differences are not 
statistically  significant ( / 2 = 6.061, 3 degrees of freedom, 
( = 0.109). In addition, Table 5 illustrates the  natu re  of irregularities 
in d isaster preparedness train ing  (based on those attend ing  
train ing sessions). It show s 31% of these households observed 
irregularities, particularly  m iddle (41%) and poor households 
(35.7%). The m ost prom inent irregularity w as nepotism  and the 
sam e people a ttend ing  training sessions (Table 6).
4.3. Access to cyclone shelters
The survey enquired  about responden ts’ access to  cyclone 
shelters. Table 7 show s th e  types of shelter used by households 
during Aila: 58% took shelter on an em bankm ent or a t hom e and 
32% in a union parishad/school/or o ther concrete building. 
Im portantly, only 10% accessed a cyclone shelter, varying from
Table 6
Types of irregularity in disaster preparedness training program by wealth quartiles.
Wealth quartiles Types of irregularities in training 
program (%)
Total
Nepotism/same 
people attended 
various training
Trainee selection 
based on political 
considerations
Ultra poor 57.1 42.9 100
Poor 71.9 28.1 100
Middle group 67.7 32.3 100
Wealthiest 57.1 42.9 100
Source: Household survey, based on m ultiple responses.
4.3% of u ltra-poor households to 13% of w ealthy  households (these 
differences are not statistically  significant). Table 7 also show s 31% 
w ere refused access to  shelters w ith  th e  g reatest proportions 
com ing from m iddle (38%) and poor (32%) households (again, these 
differences are not statistically  significant).
Furtherm ore, the table highlights reasons for th e  lack of access 
to  shelters. It show s 50% of responses pinpointed space constraints, 
and 41% referred to  households not having enough tim e to  reach 
shelters (w hich raises questions regarding th e  tim ing of early 
w arning system s, as well as th e  location of shelters -  on these 
points see Vogt e t al., 2009). Only 9% of responses from households 
claim ed space w as reserved by th e  elite  (although, interestingly, 
25% of th e  u ltra  poor though t so).
Data from focus groups support these findings. For example, 
one participant from th e  w om en’s group explained: "due to space 
constraints m any people did not get in a cyclone shelter, as they were 
fa r  away from  their house, or they previously had a bad experience. 
Most o f the people were forced to take shelter on the em bankm ent 
though it was not safe". Overall, and despite  the w idespread 
negligence to  provide w arning m essages about Aila, w e find a 
relatively low level of ‘m ild’ corruption  in pre-d isaster in terven­
tions com pared to  post-d isaster relief interventions, to  w hich we 
now  turn.
5. Corruption in post-disaster relief interventions
Post-disaster relief interventions are particularly  prone to 
corruption  because of the swift, substantial flow of resources 
required to  m eet th e  pressing needs of affected households. Such 
relief program m es are sequential. First, short- and long-term  
recovery in terventions bring im m ediate relief to affected house­
holds. Later, rehabilitation  interventions, such as grants for house 
rebuilding and em bankm ent reconstruction  provide longer-term  
assistance. W e discuss a num ber of in terventions u nder each 
category. The first part focuses on post-d isaster recovery in ter­
ventions, th e  second rehabilitation  interventions. Moreover, we 
discuss th ree  types of governm ent recovery schem es: first, 
em ergency recovery relief (w here households received Tk. 
3000-5000); second, one m edium -term  relief intervention 
(w here households received 20 kg of rice each m onth); and third,
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Table 7
Access to types of shelter during Aila.
Wealth quartiles Shelter taken during Aila (%) Refused access to 
cyclone shelter (%)
Reasons for lack o f access to cyclone 
shelter (%)*
Cyclone
shelter
Union parishad/school/ 
other concrete building
Embankment/ 
at home
Total Yes No Total Reserved by 
social elite
No
space
Not enough 
time to/other
Total
Ultra poor 4.3 25.7 70 100 25 75 100 25 33.3 41.7 100
Poor 10 38.6 51.4 100 32.1 67.9 100 12 52 36 100
Middle 13 30.4 56.5 100 38.9 61.1 100 3.7 59.3 37 100
Wealthy 13 34.8 52.2 100 26.8 73.2 100 0 43.8 56.3 100
Total 10.1 32.4 57.6 100 30.9 69.1 100 8.75 50 41.25 100
a  = 0.222, d .f=6, x 2 = 8.23 a  = 0.422, d.f =3, ^Percentages based on multiple responses
X2 = 2.809
Source: Household survey.
a longer-term  social protection m easure w here households 
received cash/food in re turn  for participating in public works. 
W e also briefly discuss NGO post-d isaster interventions. As 
outlined above, corruption  in all these in terventions received a 
‘severe’ rating (due to  th e  ex trem e vulnerability  of recipient 
households).
5.1. Emergency recovery relief (Tk. 3000-5000 per household)
After Aila, governm ent stated  it w ould provide Tk. 3-5,000 (US$ 
43-72) to each affected household to m eet im m ediate basic needs 
(w ith  th e  am ount depending on dam age to  housing stock). Table 8 
show s 97% of households received this relief (w ith  little variation by 
w ealth  quartile). However, Table 8 shows a higher proportion of 
w ealthy  households (19.4%) received m ore than  the stipulated 
single card (significant a t the 99% level of confidence). This was 
because household size w as th e  m ain criteria for allocating cards 
(w ith  households w ith  six or m ore m em bers receiving two, tw elve 
o r m ore receiving three) and the average size of households 
increases through w ealth  quartiles (from 4.33 to 5.09). However, 
Table 8 does outline m ore u ltra-poor households (8%) w ere forced to 
pay bribes com pared to  o ther w ealth  categories (significant a t the 
90% level of confidence) and paid larger bribes than  o ther categories 
(again significant a t the 90% level). Thus, survey data suggests the 
program m e did suffer from a low level of corruption. Interestingly, it 
also reveals a substantial proportion of actors receiving bribes w ere 
no t local governm ent representatives -  such as union parishad 
m em bers (30%) and chairm en (10%) -  bu t m iddlem en (60%).
Q ualitative m ethods highlighted how  further local officials saw 
an opportun ity  from th is relief program m e: th e  local land tax 
collector and chief adm inistrative officer a ttem p ted  to  collect 
ou tstand ing  land taxes from the  cash transfer. W hilst a m edia 
cam paign and interventions by the  M em ber of Parliam ent and 
upazilla chairm en stopped th is opportunistic  taxation, no action 
w as taken  against th e  actors involved. W e now  tu rn  to corruption 
in m edium -term  recovery relief.
5.2. M edium-term recovery relief (20 kg rice per household)
Following the im m ediate paym ent of cash transfers to  house­
holds, governm ent provided 20kgs of rice per m onth  for each 
household affected by Aila. Table 9 shows 98% of households 
received this recovery relief. Slightly few er ultra-poor households 
received rice com pared to o ther quartiles. More im portantly, survey 
data  shows 99% of households received less rice than  they  w ere 
entitled  to, w ith  an  average loss of 9% (sim ilar across w ealth  
categories). Again, households w ere asked w hich actor w as involved 
in this form of corruption. Survey data  show s 74% of households 
suffering from this corrupt practice reported union parishad 
m em bers w ere responsible (followed by 20% of households citing 
union parishad chairmen, and 6% reporting middlem en).
Qualitative research m ethods exam ined w hether there  w ere 
consistent rules and regulations in bo th  em ergency and m edium - 
term  recovery relief. Inform ants sta ted  m em bers and chairm en of 
union parishad hold high levels of discretionary  pow er to  allocate 
relief cards and distribu te  goods. For example, one participant 
explained "nobody received according to their en titlem ent.. .even if  
the chairman or m em ber said that one card will be given fo r  6 
members o f a household, two cards fo r  the members who are more 
than 6 and 3 cards fo r  12 members or above, this rule varied from  
person to person. The cronies o f chairmen or members got more benefit 
from  them". But w hen  w e com pare the am ount of rice received 
across categories on a per adu lt equivalent basis -  u ltra-poor 
households 5.59 kgs, poor households 5.21 kgs, m iddle households 
4.91 and w ealthy  households 4.87 -  w e find w ealth ier households 
actually received less than  poorer households (an analysis of 
variance show s th is is no t statistically  significant: dfs = 3, 267 F 
ratio  = 1.629, F te s t = 0.183). W hilst there  m ay have been cases 
w here union parishad chairm en or m em bers d istribu ted  cards as a 
form of patronage, the greater num ber of cards received by 
w ealthy  households w as due m ainly to  household size, not 
favouritism . W e now  tu rn  to  th e  last post-d isaster recovery 
interventions: a public w orks program m e.
Table 8
Emergency recovery relief (Tk. 3000-5000 per household).
Wealth quartile Receipt o f emergency 
recovery relief (%)
Number o f relief cards received (%) Forced to pay bribes (%) Average bribe paid 
(Taka)Yes No Total One Two Three Total (%) Yes No Total (%)
Ultra poor 95.7 4.3 100 97 3 0 100 7.7 92.3 100 1890
Poor 98.6 1.4 100 89.9 10.1 0 100 1.5 98.5 100 1000
Middle 97.1 2.9 100 98.5 1.5 0 100 4.6 95.4 100 350
Wealthy 97.1 2.9 100 79.1 19.4 1.5 100 0 100 100 0
Overall (%) 97.1 2.9 100 91.1 8.5 0.4 100 3.4 96.6 100 1277.8
a  = 0.796, d.f =3, x2= 1.023 a  = 0.002, d .f=6, X2 = 20.584 a  = 0.077, d.f =3, x 2 = 6.838 dfs = 2, 6 F
ratio = 3.912
F te st=0.08
Source: Household survey.
Table 9
Medium-term recovery relief and cash/food for work.
Medium-term recovery relief (20 kg rice per household) Cash/food for work
Wealth quartiles Received 20 kg rice (%) Missing rice 
(% of total)
Involvement in 
cash/food for Work 
programme (%)
Total
Types of irregularities* (%)
Total
Bribe paid or 
wage lost
(Taka)
Loss in 
wage /bribe s 
(% of monthly 
income
Yes No Total Yes No Wage
stripping
Delayed/
Uncertain
Payment
Low quality of 
work/misuse 
of resources
Bribery
Ultra poor 94.3 5.7 100 -9 .4 3 75.7 24.3 100 45.2 35.5 14 5.4 100 1548.9 77.12
Poor 97.1 2.9 100 -9 .5 2 90 10 100 36.1 39.2 22.7 2.1 100 1520.9 66.32
Middle 98.6 1.4 100 -9 .3 4 84.1 15.9 100 31.1 46.6 17.5 4.9 100 1316.5 63.97
Wealthy 100 0 100 -8 .81 68.1 31.9 100 41.9 35.5 20.4 2.2 100 2596.8 98.19
Overall (%) 97.5 2.5 100 -9 .2 8 79.5 20.5 100 38.34 39.4 18.65 3.63 100 1765.5 76.54
a  = 0.168, d.f =3, a  = 0.008, d.f=3, x 2 = 11.716 *Based on multiple responses dfs = 3, 78 F ratio = 1.424 F
X 2 = 5.050 test = 0.242
Source: Household survey.
Table 10
Irregularities in NGO relief interventions.
Wealth quartile Irregularities in NGO 
relief (%)
Total Types of irregularities (%)* Total
Yes No Bribery/stripping Nepotism Influence peddling Low quality goods
Ultra poor 47.8 52.2 100 24.1 19 46.6 10.3 100
Poor 58.6 41.4 100 15.4 29.5 35.9 19.2 100
Middle 69.6 30.4 100 19.8 32.7 34.7 12.9 100
Wealthy 79.7 20.3 100 17.9 35.8 32.1 14.2 100
Overall 63.9 36.1 100 18.95 30.61 36.15 14.29 100
at = 0.001, d.f=3, x 2 = 17.026 *Based on multiple responses
Source: Household survey.
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Table 11
Nature and extent of corruption in pre- and post-disaster interventions.
Stage Intervention types Type o f evidence:
hearsay/own
experience
Nature and extent o f corruption
Severity of 
corrupt 
practice: 
mild/severe
Incidence of 
corruption3
Type/s o f corruption Bribery paid or 
relief received 
(taka or %)
Primary actor (s) Primary victim
Pre-disaster
interventions
Warning message Own experience Mild Very high (83%) Negligence to provide services NA Government Officer, 
Public Representative
Ultra poor
Disaster preparedness 
training
Own experience Mild Medium (31%) Nepotism/favouritism/patronage NA Government officer Middle and poor
Access to cyclone 
shelter
Own experience Mild Low (9%) Influence peddling NA Social elite All
Post-disaster
interventions
Emergency recovery 
relief
Own experience Severe Low (exclusion -  3%; 
bribery -  3%)
Negligence to provide services, 
bribery/stripping
Tk. 1277 Exclusion: members and 
chairman of union parishad 
bribes: middlemen
Ultra poor
Mid-term recovery 
relief
Own experience Severe Very high (exclusion -  3%; 
stripping -  99%)
Bribery/stripping, negligence 
to provide services
9.28% Members and chairman 
of union parishad
All
Cash/food for work Own experience Severe High (68%) Bribery/stripping, misuse of 
resources, fraud
Tk. 1765 Middlemen; member and 
chairman of union parishad
Wealthy
Embankment
reconstruction
Hearsay Severe Very high (94%) Misuse o f resources, bribery stripping, 
procurement irregularities, negligence 
to provide services
Estimated by key 
informant to be 
40-55% of total 
project
Syndicate of ruling 
party activists
All
NGO interventions Own experience Severe High (64%) Influence peddling, nepotism/
favouritism/patronage,
bribery/stripping
Tk. 627 Middlemen, NGO officers, 
member and chairman 
of union parishad
Wealthy
a incidence of corruption: low  = <25%; medium = 26-50% incidence o f corruption; high = 51-75% incidence o f corruption; very high = >75%.
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5.3. Cash/food fo r  work interventions
As land in th e  upazilla w as flooded w ith  saline w ater, reduced 
labour dem and forced m any m obile residents to  m igrate to  find 
work. To tackle this situation, governm ent launched a cash/food- 
for-w ork schem e. Overall, 80% of households participated  in the 
schem e a t som e stage, w ith  a g reater proportion of poor and 
m iddle households th an  u ltra-poor and w ealthy  (statistically 
significant a t the 99% confidence level, see Table 9). However, the 
schem e w as plagued by discrepancies. Overall, 68% of respondents 
reported  irregularities, particularly  w ith  w age stripping and 
delayed or uncertain  paym ent (see Table 9).
Qualitative m ethods exam ined these  irregularities. One focus 
group com plained th e  enro lm ent list for the schem e, created on the 
first day, w as not updated  as the  num ber of w orkers decreased, 
th a t chairm en of th e  union parishad added false names, and tha t 
labourers did no t receive a fixed am oun t of rice. Table 9 show s the 
average w ages lost or bribes paid by households in this schem e 
cam e to Tk. 1766 (US$ 25). Looking into w ealth  quartiles, w ealthy 
households lost m ore w ages (both  in absolu te term s and as a 
proportion  of m onthly  incom e) com pared to o ther groups.
A further issue highlighted by focus groups w as th e  low quality  
o f w ork conducted on th e  scheme. For exam ple, one participant 
reported: "the work was awarded to inexperienced sub-contractors. 
They do not know how to reconstruct roads, daws or embankments 
especially in the coastal belt. A fter finishing some work, the roads/ 
em bankments were ju s t washed away by a tidal surge. They used this 
as an excuse not to pay wages to workers".
Overall, recovery relief a fter Aila suffered from varied levels of 
corruption: low  levels of bribery in theT k. 5000 program m e; very 
high levels of asset stripping by union parishad chairm en and 
m em bers in the  food d istribution  program m e; and high levels of 
w age stripping and delayed/uncertain  paym ent, as w ell as o ther 
irregularities, in the public w orks program m e. W e now  tu rn  to 
corruption  in one post-d isaster rehabilitation  intervention.
6. Rehabilitation intervention
Here w e consider one m ajor governm ent program m e: em bank­
m en t reconstruction. In July 2009, the M inistry of Food and 
Disaster M anagem ent allocated Tk. 1150 million (US$ 16.4 million) 
to  th e  W ater D evelopm ent Board for th e  repair of vital em bank­
m ents dam aged or destroyed in Aila. This section exam ines 
people’s perceptions about governm ent’s steps to  reconstruct 
em bankm ents, and tries to identify the ex ten t o f corruption  in this 
intervention. As highlighted above, because th is da ta  is not based 
on direct experience bu t on hearsay w e need to  be cautious about 
these findings.
The first point to note is th e  W ater D evelopm ent Board failed to 
com m ence em bankm ent reconstruction  prom ptly. For example, 
on 7 th  April 2010, th e  Prime M inister criticised officials for this 
failure (The Daily Star, 2010). The Prime M inister’s dissatisfaction 
is reflected in responden ts’ perceptions: 82% did not feei necessary 
action had been taken  to  reconstruct em bankm ents after Aila, and 
alm ost 60% w ere fully dissatisfied w ith  the  governm ent’s response. 
Two focus groups sta ted  a clear preference th e  arm y should have 
been deployed from the start for this vital task.
Survey da ta  show s 94% of respondents reported  irregularities in 
th e  em bankm ent reconstruction  process including th e  m isuse of 
resources, low quality  of w ork and corrupt tendering. The political 
m echanism s a t w ork here w ere hard to untangle. It w as reported  
th e  m ain contractor w as prevented from w orking due to  pressure 
from a cadre w ith in  the  ruling political party. Moreover, it w as 
sta ted  the  contractor w as forced to sub-contract to  this cadre: in 
o ther words, it w as alleged local governm ent representatives, 
party  activists and w ealthy  households, under th e  protection  of the
M em ber o f Parliam ent, formed a syndicate w hich w as sub­
contracted  to  com plete the  work. Due to tim e pressure, the 
research could not pursue th is line of enquiry. W e now  tu rn  to the 
final post-d isaster intervention: NGO program m es.
6.1. NGO post-disaster interventions
The survey found 98% of households received som e kind of 
relief (in cash or in kind) from NGOs (ranging from 100% of u ltra ­
poor households to 94.2% of w ealthy  households, significant a t the 
95% level). Overall 64% found irregularities in NGO operations, 
w ith, interestingly, w ealthy  households (80%) reporting the 
g reatest incidence of corrupt practices (significant a t the  99% 
level w ith  one non response excluded). Table 10 also show s 
influence peddling by representatives and nepotism  w ere the m ost 
com m on irregularity, followed by bribery and asset stripping. In 
addition, the quality  and appropriateness of goods d istribu ted  by 
NGOs w as questioned. For exam ple, one participant in a FGD stated  
"m ost often the relief goods were not suitable fo r  Bangladesh 
considering the socio-economic condition. For example, they gave 
mosquito nets which are washable only in a machine, and they gave 
tents which are not suitable fo r  high temperatures so get damaged 
within a fe w  m onths due to the hot w eather and rain.”
The am oun t paid in bribes by tw en ty  th ree  households varied 
across th e  poverty /w ealth  categories. On average, u ltra-poor 
households paid Tk. 325, poor households Tk. 330, m iddle 
households Tk. 438 and w ealthy  households Tk. 1040 (dfs = 3, 
19 F ratio = 1.62 F te s t = 0.218). Over half these households paid 
th is bribe to  a m iddlem an, w ith  the  rem aining households e ither 
paying an  NGO officer o r a m em ber/chairm an of th e  union 
parishad.
7. Discussion
Almost every household surveyed reported  losses from corrupt 
practices before o r after Aila. The key findings are sum m arised in 
Table 11. Overall, w hilst poorer households w ere affected m ore by 
‘m ild’ corruption  in pre-d isaster interventions, th e  incidence of 
corruption  in these schem es w as low er th an  in post-d isaster 
operations, especially food aid d istributions and public works. 
Interestingly, w ealthy  households w ere affected m ore by the 
‘severe’ corruption  after Aila, especially w ith in  public w orks and 
non-governm ental interventions. These findings con trast w ith  
Iftekharuzzam an’s (2009) national findings w here poorer house­
holds bore the b run t o f corrupt practices (due to  th e  higher 
proportion  of incom e spent). Our findings also highlight different 
types of corruption  before and after Aila: negligence to provide 
services and nepotism  w ere m ost com m on w ith in  pre-disaster 
interventions. In post-d isaster interventions, w age/asset stripping, 
b ribery and the  m isuse of resources w ere m ost prevalent.
8. Conclusion
Broadening ou t from this particular case, these findings m ay 
hold relevance for agencies involved in adaptation . Bangladesh is 
frequently  applauded for efforts to  m ainstream  adapta tion  into 
policy (such as th rough  integrating clim ate concerns into the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) and creating th e  necessary 
funding m echanism s to absorb large clim ate resource flows (such 
as the National Climate Change Trust Fund and Climate Resilience 
Fund). V ibrant civil society organisations in Bangladesh have 
supported  au tonom ous adapta tion  initiatives such as com m unity- 
based adap ta tion  (for exam ple, see Huq and Reid, 2007). However, 
our findings suggest w ithou t increasing integrity, hard-w on 
funding will not increase th e  resilience of poor households and 
com m unities to  th e  ex ten t it might.
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This is because there  is considerable overlap betw een  th e  eight 
in terventions assessed here and th e  adap ta tion  pillars highlighted 
by the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan, and early projects 
financed by Climate Change Trust Fund and Climate Resilience 
Fund. For exam ple, the Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan 
covers a ten -year period (2009-2018) im plem ented in tw o phases: 
2009-2013  and 2014-2018  (MoEF, 2009). In th e  first phase 
governm ent highlighted six pillars, th e  first th ree  of w hich 
resonate w ith  th e  cyclone preparedness and relief efforts evaluated 
in th is article: food security, social protection  and health; 
com prehensive d isaster m anagem ent; infrastructure; research 
and know ledge m anagem ent; m itigation and low carbon devel­
opm ent; and capacity building & institu tional strengthening 
(MoEF, 2009:27-32). Moreover, the  funding allocation under the 
Climate Change Trust Fund show s a d istinct focus on d isaster 
p reparedness and relief efforts. Of th e  US$95.36 m illion allocated 
to  projects as of Decem ber 2011, over US$56 m illion w as directed 
to  projects under the  first th ree  pillars o f th e  Strategy and Action 
Plan. Indeed, th e  first approved project w as US$25 m illion for 
constructing  cyclone shelters. The budget allocations u nder the 
Climate Change Trust Fund also show  the W ater D evelopm ent 
Board as the  m inistry  receiving th e  g reatest proportion  of funds, 
th e  sam e body w hich 94% of respondents alleged w as involved in 
corrup t practices during em bankm ent reconstruction. Turning to 
th e  Climate Resilience Fund, som e initial projects also reflect 
sim ilar d isaster preparedness priorities, including th e  construction  
o f cyclone shelters.
The precise anti-corrup tion  m easures th a t m ight w ork w ith in  
adap ta tion  projects are not easy to  discern. For exam ple, the 
literatu re  on corruption  outlines generic approaches such as extra 
paym ents to  civil servants to  increase honesty  (so-called efficiency 
wages), increased com petition  betw een  public officials, increased 
m onitoring and sustained public aw areness cam paigns (see 
Bardhan, 1997). Olken (2007) usefully con trasts such traditional, 
top-dow n instrum ents w ith  grassroots, local-level m onitoring (for 
exam ple, th e  use of social aud it tools, or supporting transparen t 
and com petitive p rocurem ent system s th rough  engaging civil 
society in tendering  and selection processes). In th e  Indonesian 
case Olken (2007) exam ined, the conventional th rea t of a top- 
dow n aud it reduced corruption  to  a greater ex ten t th an  bo ttom -up  
local-level m onitoring. It m ay well be the case th a t experim enting 
w ith  specific an ti-corrup tion  m easures in Bangladesh could shed 
light on effective rem edies. W hilst only a first step, such analysis 
could assist governm ent, non-governm ental organisations and 
developm ent partners in form ulating a range o f innovative 
m easures during im plem entation.
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